(And his theories were received, not so mubsp;for their own sake, as bebsp;of his excellent moral character; for he was thought to be emily possd of perfebsp;lf-mastery, and therefore it was not thought that he said the things bebsp;he was a lover of Pleasure but that he really was so vinced.)
And he thought his position was not less proved by the argument from the trary: that is, sinbsp;Pain was in itlf an objebsp;of avoidanbsp;to all the trary must be in like manner an objebsp;of choice.
Again he urged that that is most choiceworthy whibsp;we choo, not by reason of, or with a view to, anything further; and that Pleasure is fesdly of this kind bebsp;no one ever goes on to ask to what purpo he is plead, feeling that Pleasure is in itlf choiceworthy.
Again, that when added to any other good it makes it more choiceworthy; as, for instanbsp;to as of justibsp;or perfected lf-mastery; and good bsp;only be incread by itlf.
However, this argument at least ems to prove only that it belongs to the class of goods, and not that it does so more than anything el:for every good is more choicewortby in bination with some other than when taken quite alone.
In fabsp;it is by just subsp;an argument that Plato proves that Pleasure is not the Chief Good: "For," says he, "the life of Pleasure is more choiceworthy in bination with Practibsp;Wisdom than apart from it; but, if the pound better then simple Pleasure ot be the Chief Good; bebsp;the very Chief Good ot by any addition bee choiceworthy than it is already:" and it is obvious that nothing el bsp;be the Chief Good, whibsp;by bination with any of the things in themlves good es to be more choiceworthy.
What is there then of subsp;a nature? (meaning, of cour, whereof we bsp;partake; bebsp;that whibsp;we are in arbsp;of must be such).
As for tho who objebsp;that "what all aim at is not necessarily good," I fess I ot e mubsp;in what they say, bebsp;what all think we say is.
And he who would bsp;away this ground from under us will not bring forward things more dependable: bebsp;if the argument had rested on the desires of irrational creatures there might have been something in what he says, but, sinbsp;the rational also desire Pleasure, how bsp;his obje be allowed any weight? and it may be that, even in the lower animals, there is some natural good principle above themlves whibsp;aims at the good peculiar to them.
Nor does that em to be sound whibsp;is urged respeg the argument from the trary: I mean, some people say "it does not follow that Pleasure must be good bebsp;Pain is evil, sinbsp;evil may be oppod to evil, and both evil and good to what is indifferent:" now what they say is right enough in itlf but does not hold in the prent instance.