It may happen that the point in which another man surpasses me is a point of some importance to my welfare or convenience. I want， for example， to sink a well. It may happen that I have not the leisure or the means to acquire the science necessary for this purpose. Upon that supposition， I am not to be blamed if I employ a builder for the first or a mechanic for the second； nor shall I be liable if I work in person under his direction.
This sort of obedience is distinguished by the appellation of confidence；Chapter nd to justify， in a moral view， the reposing of confidence， the only thing necessary is that it should be fitter and more beneficial， all things considered， that the function to be performed should be performed by me.
The third and last kind of obedience necessary to be adverted to upon the present occasion is where I do that which is not prescribed to me by my private judgement， merely on account of the mischievous consequences that I foresee will be annexed to my omission by the arbitrary interference of some voluntary being.
The most important observation that arises upon the statement of scale of obedience in the second degree ought to be guarded with as much jealousy， and kept to the person yielding obedience within as narrow limits as possible.
The last sort of obedience will frequently be necessary. Voluntary beings constitute a large portion of the universe； we shall often have occasion to foresee their arbitrary determinations and conduct， nor can knowledge， as such， in any instance fail to be a desirable acquisition； our conduct therefore must and ought to be modified by their interferences. Morality， as has already been frequently observed， consists entirely in an estimate of consequences； he is the truly virtuous man who produces the greatest portion of benefit his situation will admit. The most exalted morality indeed， that in which the heart reposes with the most unmingled satisfaction， relates to the inherent and indefeasible tendencies of actions. But we shall be by no means excusable if we overlook， in our system of conduct， the arbitrary awards of other men. Nothing can be more certain than that an action， suppose of inferior moment or utility， which for its own sake might be right to be performed， it may become my duty to neglect if I know that by performing it I shall incur the penalty of death.