The battlecry that ushered in the modern era in Japan was Sonno joi，“Restore the Emperor and expel the Barbarian。”It was a slogan that sought to keep Japan uncontam-inated by the outside world and to restore a golden age of the tenth century before there had been a“dual rule”of Emperor and Shogun。The Emperor's court at Kyoto was reac-tionary in the extreme。The victory of the Emperor's party meant to his supporters the humiliation and expulsion of foreigners。It meant reinstatement of traditional ways of life in Japan。It meant that“reformers”would have no voice in affairs。The great Outside Lords，the daimyo of Japan's strongest fiefs who spearheaded the overthrow of the Shogu-nate，thought of the Restoration as a way in which they，instead of the Tokugawa，could rule Japan。They wanted a mere change of personnel。The farmers wanted to keep more of the rice they raised but they hated“reforms。”The samurai wanted to keep their pen-sions and be allowed to use their swords for greater glory。The merchants，who financed the Restoration forces，wanted to expand mercantilism but they never arraigned the feu-dal system。
When the anti-Tokugawa forces triumphed and“dual rule”was ended in 1868 by the Restoration of the Emperor，the victors were committed，by Western standards，to a fiercely conservative isolationist policy。From the first the regime followed the opposite course。It had been in power hardly a year when it abolished the daimyo's right of taxa-tion in all fiefs。It called in the land-registers and appropriated to itself the peasants'tax of“40 per cent to the daimyo。”This expropriation was not without compensation。The government allotted to each daimyo the equivalent of half his normal income。At the same time also the government freed the daimyo of the support of his samurai retainers and of the expenses of public works。The samurai retainers，like the daimyo，received pensions from the government。Within the next five years all legal inequality among the classes was summarily abolished，insignia and distinctive dress of caste and class were outlawed-even queues had to be cut，-the outcasts were emancipated，the laws a-gainst alienation of land withdrawn，the barriers that had separated fief from fief were re-moved and Buddhism was disestablished。By 1876 the daimyo and samurai pensions were commuted to lump sum payments which were to become due in five to fifteen years。These payments were either large or small according to the fixed income these in-dividuals had drawn in Tokugawa days and the money made it possible for them to start enterprises in the new non-feudal economy。“It was the final stage in the sealing of that peculiar union of merchants and financial princes with the feudal or landed princes which was already evident in the Tokugawa period。”
These remarkable reforms of the infant Meiji regime were not popular。There was far more general enthusiasm for an invasion of Korea from 1871 to 1873 than for any of these measures。The Meiji government not only persisted in its drastic course of reform，it killed the project of the invasion。Its program was so strongly opposed to the wishes of a great majority of those who had fought to establish it that by 1877 Saigo，their greatest leader had organized a full-scale rebellion against the government。His army represented all the pro-feudal longings of Imperial supporters which had from the first year of the Restoration been betrayed by the Meiji regime。The government called up a non-samu-rai voluntary army and defeated Saigo's samurai。But the rebellion was an indication of the extent of the dissatisfaction the regime aroused in Japan。
The farmers'dissatisfaction was equally marked。There were at least 190 agrarian revolts between 1868 and 1878，the first Meiji decade。In 1877 the new government made its first tardy moves to lessen the great tax burden upon the peasants，and they had reason to feel that the regime had failed them。The farmers objected in addition to the establishment of schools，to conscription，to land surveys，to having to cut their queues，to legal equality of the outcasts，to the drastic restrictions on official Buddhism，to cal-endar reforms and to many other measures which changed their settled ways of life。
Who，then，was this“government”which undertook such drastic and unpopular reforms？It was that“peculiar union”in Japan of the lower samurai and the merchant class which special Japanese institutions had fostered even in feudal times。They were the samurai retainers who had learned statecraft as chamberlains and stewards for the daimyos，who had run the feudal monopolies in mines，textiles，pasteboards and the like。They were merchants who had bought samurai status and spread knowledge of pro-ductive techniques in that class。This samurai-merchant alliance rapidly put to the fore able and self-confident administrators who drew up the Meiji policies and planned their execution。The real problem，however，is not from what class they came but how it hap-pened that they were so able and so realistic。Japan，just emerging from medievalism in the last half of the nineteenth century and as weak then as Siam is today，produced lead-ers able to conceive and to carry out one of the most statesmanlike and successful jobs ever attempted in any nation。The strength，and the weakness too，of these leaders was rooted in traditional Japanese character and it is the chief object of this book to discuss what that character was and is。Here we can only recognize how the Meiji statesmen went about their undertaking。
They did not take their task to be an ideological revolution at all。They treated it as a job。Their goal as they conceived it was to make Japan into a country which must be reckoned with。They were not iconoclasts。They did not revile and beggar the feudal class。They tempted them with pensions large enough to lure them into eventual support of the regime。They finally ameliorated the peasants'condition；their ten-year tardiness appears to have been due rather to the pitiful condition of the early Meiji treasury than to a class rejection of peasants'claims upon the regime。
The energetic and resourceful statesmen who ran the Meiji government rejected，however，all ideas of ending hierarchy in Japan。The Restoration had simplified the hi-erarchal order by placing the Emperor at its apex and eliminating the Shogun。The post-Restoration statesmen，by abolishing the fiefs，eliminated the conflict between loyalty to one's own seigneur and to the State。These changes did not unseat hierarchal habits。They gave them a new locus。“Their Excellencies，”the new leaders of Japan，even strengthened centralized rule in order to impose their own workmanlike programs upon the people。They alternated demands from above with gifts from above and in this way they managed to survive。But they did not imagine that they had to cater to a public o-pinion which might not want to reform the calendar or to establish public schools or to outlaw discrimination against the outcasts。
One of these gifts from above was the Constitution of Japan，which was given by the Emperor to his people in 1889.It gave the people a place in the State and established the Diet。It was drawn up with great care by Their Excellencies after critical study of the varied constitutions of the Western World。The writers of it however，took“every possi-ble precartion to guard against popular interference and the invasion of public opinion。”The very bureau which drafted it was a part of the Imperial Household Department and was therefore sacrosanct。
Meiji statesmen were quite conscious about their objective。During the eighteen-eighties Prince Ito，framer of the Constitution，sent the Marquis Kido to consult Herbert Spencer in England on the problems lying ahead of Japan and after lengthy conversations Spencer wrote to his judgments。On the subject of hierarchy Spencer wrote that Japan had in her traditional arrangements an incomparable basis for national well-being which should be maintained and fostered。Traditional obligations to superiors，he said，and beyond all to the Emperor，were Japan's great opportunity。Japan could move forward solidly under its“superiors”and defend itself against the difficulties inevitable in more individualistic nations。The great Meiji statesmen were well satisfied with this confirma-tion of their own convictions。They meant to retain in the modern world the advantages of observing“proper station。”They did not intend to undermine the habit of hierarchy。
In every field of activity，whether political or religious or economic，the Meiji states-men allocated the duties of“proper station”between the State and the people。Their whole scheme was so alien to arrangements in the United States or England that we usually fail to recognize its basic points。There was，of course，strong rule from above which did not have to follow the lead of public opinion。This government was administered by a top hierarchy and this could never include elected persons。At this level the people could have no voice。In 1940 the top government hierarchy consisted of those who had“access”to the Emperor，those who constituted his immediate advisors，and those whose high ap-pointments bore the privy seal。These last included Cabinet Ministers，prefectural gover-nors，judges，chiefs of national bureaus and other like responsible officers。No elected of-ficial had any such status in the hierarchy and it would have been out of the question for elected members of the Diet，for instance，to have any voice in selecting or approving a Cabinet Minister or head of the Bureau of Finance or of Transportation。The elected Lower House of the Diet was a voice of the people which had the not inconsiderable privilege of interrogating and criticizing the Higher Officials，but it had no real voice in appointments or in decisions or in budgetary matters and it did not initiate legislation。The Lower House was even checked by a non-elected Upper House，half of them nobility and another quar-ter Imperial appointees。Since its power to approve legislation was about equal to that of the Lower House，a further hierarchal check was provided。
Japan therefore ensured that those who held high government posts remain“Their Excellencies，”but this does not mean that there was not self-government in its“proper place。”In all Asiatic nations，under whatever regime，authority from above always rea-ches down and meets in some middle ground local self-government rising from below。The differences between different countries all concern matters of how far up democratic accountability reaches，how many or few its responsibilities are and whether local lead-ership remains responsive to the whole community or is preempted by local magnates to the disadvantage of the people。Tokugawa Japan had，like China，tiny units of five to ten families，called in recent times the tonari gumi，which were the smallest responsible units of the population。The head of this group of neighboring families assumed leader-ship in their own affairs，was responsible for their good behavior，had to turn in reports of any doubtful acts and surrender any wanted individual to the government。Meiji statesmen at first abolished these，but they were later restored and called the tonari gu-mi。In the towns and cities the government has sometimes actively fostered them，but they seldom function today in villages。The hamlet（buraku）units are more important。The buraku were not abolished nor were they incorporated as units in the government。They were an area in which the State did not function。These hamlets of fifteen or so houses continue even today to function in an organized fashion through their annually ro-tating headmen，who“look after hamlet property，supervise hamlet aid given to families in the event of a death or a fire，decide the proper days for co-operative work in agricul-ture，housebuilding or road repair，and announce by ringing the fire bell or beating two blocks together in a certain rhythm the local holidays and rest days。”These headmen are not responsible，as in some Asiatic nations，also for collecting the State taxes in their community and they do not therefore have to carry this onus。Their position is quite unambivalent；they function in the area of democratic responsibility。