Americans have good reason to be proud of their part in the administration of Japan since VJ-Day。The great issue at the time of Japan's surrender was the nature of the oc-cupation。Were the victors to use the existing government，even the Emperor，or was it to be liquidated？Was there to be a town-by-town，province-by-province administration，with Military Government officers of the United States in command？The State-War-Navy directive to General MacArthur embodied a great decision on these matters，a decision which General MacArthur's Headquarters fully supported。The Japanese were to be re-sponsible for the administration and reconstruction of their country。
In the United States we have argued endlessly about hard and soft peace terms。The real issue is not between hard and soft。The problem is to use that amount of hardness，no more and no less，which will break up old and dangerous patterns of aggressiveness and set new goals。The means to be chosen depend on the character of the people and upon the traditional social order of the nation in question。Prussian authoritarianism，embedded as it is in the family and in the daily civic life，makes necessary certain kinds of peace terms for Germany。Wise peace directives would differ from those for Japan。
The problem in Japanese culture is not crass authoritarianism。The father is a per-son who treats his young children with a respect and fondness which has seemed to al-most all Western observers to be exceptional in Occidental experience。Because the Jap-anese child takes for granted certain kinds of real comradeship with his father and is o-vertly proud of him，the father's simple change of voice can make the child carry out his wishes。But the father is no martinet to his young children，and adolescence is not a pe-riod of revolt against parental authority。
This attitude which is learned by the child in his earliest experiences with his father becomes a pattern throughout Japanese society。Men who are accorded the highest marks of respect because of their hierarchal position do not characteristically themselves wield arbitrary power。The officials who head the hierarchy do not typically exercise the actual authority。From the Emperor down，advisers and hidden forces work in the background。Everything is done，as Westerners so often say，“with mirrors。”Every effort is made to minimize the appearance of arbitrary authority，and to make every act appear to be a gesture of loyalty to the status-symbol who is so constantly divorced from real exercise of power。When the Japanese do identify a source of unmasked power，they regard it as ex-ploitive and as unworthy of their system。
The Japanese，viewing their world in this way，can stage revolts against exploitation and injustice without ever becoming revolutionists。They do not offer to tear the fabric of their world in pieces。They can institute the most thoroughgoing changes，as they did in the Meiji era，without casting any aspersion upon the system。
Japan's real strength which she can use in remaking herself into a peaceful nation lies in her ability to say of a course of action，“That failed，”and then to throw her en-ergies into other channels。The Japanese have an ethic of alternatives。They tried to a-chieve their“proper place”in war，and they lost。That course，now，they can discard，because their whole training has conditioned them to possible changes of direction。