PROP。10.So long as we are not assailed by emotions contrary to our nature，we have the power of arranging and associating the modifications of our body according to the intellectual order。
Proof。-The emotions，which are contrary to our nature，that is，which are bad，are bad in so far as they impede the mind from understanding。So long，therefore，as we are not assailed by emotions contrary to our nature，the mind s power，whereby it en-deavours to understand things，is not impeded，and therefore it is able to form clear and distinct ideas and to deduce them one from another；consequently we have in such cases the power of arranging and associating the modifications of the body according to the in-tellectual order。
PROP。11.In Proportion as a mental image is referred to more objects，so is it more frequent，or more often vivid，and occupies the mind more。
Proof。-In Proportion as a mental image or an emotion is referred to more objects，so are there more causes whereby it can be aroused and fostered，all of which the mind contemplates simultaneously in association with the given emotion；therefore the emotion is more frequent，or is more often in full vigour，and occupies the mind more。
PROP。12.The mental images of things are more easily associated with the re-ferred to things which we clearly and distinctly understand，than with others。
Proof。-Things，which we clearly and distinctly understand，are either the com-mon Properties of things or deductions therefrom，and are consequently more often a-roused in us。Wherefore it may more readily happen，that we should contemplate other things in conjunction with these than in conjunction with something else，and conse-quently that the images of the said things should be more often associated with the ima-ges of these than with the images of something else。
PROP。13.A mental image is more vivid，in Proportion as it is associated with a greater number of other images。
Proof。-In Proportion as an image is associated with a greater number of other ima-ges，so are there more causes whereby it can be aroused。
PROP。14.The mind can bring it about，that all bodily modifications or images of things may be referred to God s idea。
Proof。-There is no modification of the body，whereof the mind may not form some clear and distinct conception；wherefore it can bring it about，that they should all be re-ferred to God s idea。
PROP。15.He who clearly and distinctly understands himself and his emotions loves God，and so much the more in Proportion as he understands himself and his emo-tions。
Proof。-He who clearly and distinctly understands himself and his emotions feels pleasure，and this pleasure is accompanied by God s idea；therefore such an one loves God，and so much the more in Proportion as he more understands himself and his emo-tions。
PROP。16.This love towards God must hold the chief place in the mind。
Proof。-For this love is associated with all the modifications of the body and is fos-tered by them all；therefore，it must hold the chief place in the mind。
PROP。17.God is without passions，neither is he affected by any emotion of pleas-ure or pain。
Proof。-All ideas，in so far as they are referred to God，are true，that is adequate；and therefore God is without passions。Again，God cannot pass either to a greater or to a lesser perfection；therefore he is not affected by any emotion of pleasure or pain。
Corollary。-Strictly speaking，God does not love or hate anyone。For God is not affected by any emotion of pleasure or pain，consequently he does not love or hate any-one。
PROP。18.No one can hate God。
Proof。-God s idea which is in us is adequate and perfect；wherefore，in so far as we contemplate God，we are active；consequently there can be no pain accompanied by God s idea，in other words，no one can hate God。
Corollary。-Love towards God cannot be turned into hate。
PROP。19.He，who loves God，cannot endeavour that God should love him in re-turn。
Proof。-For，if a man should so endeavour，he would desire that God，whom he loves，should not be God，and consequently he would desire to feel pain；which is ab-surd。Therefore，he who loves God，＆c。
PROP。20.This love towards God cannot be stained by the emotion of envy or jeal-ousy；contrariwise，it is the more fostered，in Proportion as we conceive a greater num-ber of men to be joined to God by the same bond of love。
Proof。-This love towards God is the highest good which we can seek for under the guidance of reason，it is common to all men，and we desire that all should rejoice there-in；therefore，it cannot be stained by the emotion envy nor by，the emotion of jealous-y，；but，contrariwise，it must needs be the more fostered，in Proportion as we conceive a greater number of men to rejoice therein。
Note。-We can in the same way，show，that there is no emotion directly contrary to this love，whereby this love can be destroyed；therefore we may conclude，that this love towards God is the most constant of all the emotions，and that，in so far as it is re-ferred to the body，it cannot be destroyed，unless the body be destroyed also。As to its nature，in so far as it is referred to the mind only，we shall presently inquire。
I have through all the remedies against the emotions，or all that the mind，consid-ered in itself alone，can do against them。Whence it appears that the mind s power over the emotions consists：
1.In the actual knowledge of the emotions。
2.In the fact that it separates the emotions from the thought of an external cause，which we conceive confusedly。
3.In the fact，that，in respect to time，the emotions referred to things，which we distinctly understand，surpass those referred to what we conceive in a confused and frag-mentary manner。
4.In the number of causes whereby those modifications，are fostered，which have regard to the common Properties of things or to God。
5.Lastly，in the order wherein the mind can arrange and associate，one with another，its own emotions。
But，in order that this power of the mind over the emotions may be better under-stood，it should be specially observed that the emotions are called by us strong，when we compare the emotion of one man with the emotion of another，and see that one man is more troubled than another by the same emotion；or when we are comparing the various emotions of the same man one with another，and find that he is more affected or stirred by one emotion than by another。For the strength of every emotion is defined by a com-parison of our own power with the power of an external cause。Now the power of the mind is defined by knowledge only，and its infirmity or passion is defined by the priva-tion of knowledge only；it therefore follows，that that mind is most passive，whose grea-test part is made up of inadequate ideas，so that it may be characterized more readily by its passive states than by its activities；on the other hand，that mind is most active，whose greatest part is made up of adequate ideas，so that，although it may contain as many inadequate ideas as the former mind，it may yet be more easily characterized by i-deas attributable to human virtue，than by ideas which tell of human infirmity。Again，it must be observed，that spiritual unhealthiness；and misfortunes can generally be traced to excessive love for something which is subject to many variations，and which we can never become masters of。For no one is solicitous or anxious about anything，unless he loves it；neither do wrongs，suspicions，enmities，arise，except in regard to things whereof no one can be really master。
We may thus readily conceive the power which clear and distinct knowledge，and especially that third kind of knowledge，founded on the actual knowledge of God，pos-sesses over the emotions；if it does not absolutely destroy them，in so far as they are passions；at any rate，it causes them to occupy a very small part of the mind。Further，it begets a love towards a thing immutable and eternal，whereof we may really enter into possession；neither can it be defiled with those faults which are inherent in ordinary love；but it may grow from strength to strength，and may engross the greater part of the mind，and deeply penetrate it。
And now I have finished with all that concerns this present life；for，as I said in the beginning of this note，I have briefly described all the remedies against the emo-tions。And this everyone may readily have seen for himself，if he has attended to what is advanced in the present note，and also to the definitions of the mind and its emotions，and，lastly，to Propositions 1.and 3.of Part 3.It is now，therefore，time to pass on to those matters，which appertain to the duration of the mind，without relation to the body。
PROP。21.The mind can only imagine anything，or remember what is past，while the body endures。
Proof。-The mind does not express the actual existence of its body，nor does it i-magine the modifications of the body as actual，except while the body endures；and，consequently，it does not imagine any body as actually existing，except while its own body endures。Thus it cannot imagine anything，or remember things past，except while the body endures。
PROP。22.Nevertheless in God there is necessarily an idea，which expresses the essence of this or that human body under the form of eternity。
Proof。-God is the cause，not only of the existence of this or that human body，but also of its essence。This essence，therefore，must necessarily be conceived through the very essence of God，and be thus conceived by a certain eternal necessity；and this con-ception must necessarily exist in God。
PROP。23.The human mind cannot be absolutely destroyed with the body，but there remains of it something which is eternal。
Proof。-There is necessarily in God a concept or idea，which expresses the essence of the human body，which，therefore，is necessarily something appertaining to the es-sence of the human mind。But we have not assigned to the human mind any，duration，definable by time，except in so far as it expresses the actual existence of the body，which is explained through duration，and may be defined by time-that is，we do not assign to it duration，except while the body endures。Yet，as there is something，not-withstanding，which is conceived by a certain eternal necessity through the very essence of God；this something，which appertains to the essence of the mind，will necessarily be eternal。
PROP。24.The more we understand particular things，the more do we understand God。
Proof。-This is evident from 1.25.Coroll。
PROP。25.The highest endeavour of the mind，and the highest virtue is to under-stand things by the third kind of knowledge。
Proof。-The third kind of knowledge proceeds from an adequate idea of certain at-tributes of God to an adequate knowledge of the essence of things；and，in Proportion as we understand things more in this way，we better understand God；therefore the highest virtue of the mind，that is the power，or nature，or highest endeavour of the mind，is to understand things by the third kind of knowledge。
PROP。26.In Proportion as the mind is more capable of understanding things by the third kind of knowledge，it desires more to understand things by that kind。
Proof。-This is evident。For，in so far as we conceive the mind to be capable of conceiving things by this kind of knowledge，we，to that extent，conceive it as deter-mined thus to conceive things；and consequently，the mind desires so to do，in Propor-tion as it is more capable thereof。
PROP。27.The greatest satisfaction of mind there can be arises from this third kind of knowledge。
Proof。-The highest virtue of the mind is to know God，or to understand things by the third kind of knowledge，and this virtue is greater in Proportion as the mind knows things more by the said kind of knowledge；consequently，he who knows things by this kind of knowledge passes to the summit of human perfection，and is therefore affected by the highest pleasure，such pleasure being accompanied by the idea of himself and his own virtue；thus，from this kind of knowledge arises the highest possible acquiescence。
PROP。28.The endeavour or desire to know things by the third kind of knowledge cannot arise from the first，but from the second kind of knowledge。
Proof。-This Proposition is self-evident。For whatsoever we understand clearly and distinct we understand either through itself，or through that which is conceived through itself；that is，ideas which are clear and distinct in us，or which are referred to the third kind of knowledge cannot follow from ideas that are fragmentary，and confused，and are referred to knowledge of the first kind，but must follow from adequate ideas，or ideas of the second and third kind of knowledge；therefore，the desire of knowing things by the third kind of knowledge cannot arise from the first，but from the second kind。