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後記
近年來，伴隨著經濟增長、綜合國力提高和法製化建設進程的推進，政府信用問題日益受到人們的廣泛關注。在現代社會，政府信用是社會信用的核心。建立良好的政府信用，有益於充分體現政府施政的合法性和權威性；有助於塑造現代政府良好的社會形象；有利於提高政府行政效率和公共服務水平；有助於穩定公眾的理性預期，降低政府與其他經濟主體經濟活動中的交易成本；有利於整個社會信用體係的建立和完善。
在本書中，我將政府信用定義為國家行政機關作為社會經濟管理者、公共產品的提供者、獨立的經濟人，在其管理活動、服務活動、供給行為和交易行為中，能夠履行契約，取得公眾信任的行為和品質。在經濟體製、政治體製改革不斷深入的大趨勢下，公眾對政府信用的期許與對懲治腐敗的訴求密不可分。官員的尋租－腐敗是導致政府信用缺失的外在原因，個體理性和集體理性的衝突是政府信用缺失的內在根源。政府每一項政策的實施，都是政策製定者和執行者共同參與完成的，是集體行動和個人行動、集體理性和個體理性博弈的結果。
七年來，我一直在政府經濟部門一線從事投融資工作，深知政府信用這一課題需要深入研究的還有很多，我的研究肯定也有很多不足之處，希望方家能共同探討、批評、指正。
《政府信用》即將付梓出版，在此衷心感謝我的導師韓康教授。在中央黨校從師三載，獲益頗多。導師高尚的人品、深厚的學術造詣、淵博的理論知識以及嚴謹的治學態度，永遠是我的榜樣。感謝我的妻子楊輝華女士、女兒王欣頤，感謝她們的愛，感謝她們的支持！
王孝偉
2013年秋於蕪湖建投公司